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Abstract—Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) will
soon allow a large number of individuals to have their genome
fully sequenced. This lays the foundations to improve modern
healthcare, enabling a new era of personalized medicine where
diagnosis and treatment is tailored to the patient’s genetic
makeup. It also allows individuals motivated by personal curiosity
to have access to their genetic information, and use it, e.g., to trace
their ancestry. However, the very same progress also amplifies
a number of ethical and privacy concerns, that stem from the
unprecedented sensitivity of genomic information and that are
not well studied.
This paper presents an exploratory ethnographic study of
users’ perception of privacy and ethical issues with WGS, as well
as their attitude toward different WGS programs. We report on
a series of semi-structured interviews, involving 16 participants,
and analyze the results both quantitatively and qualitatively. Our
analysis shows that users exhibit common trust concerns and fear
of discrimination, and demand to retain strict control over their
genetic information. Finally, we highlight the need for further
research in the area and follow-up studies that build on our
initial findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past half a century, research on DNA sequencing –
the process of determining the precise order of nucleotides
within a DNA molecule – has made tremendous progress.
The first complete human genome was sequenced in 2003
within a 13-year, $3B project known as the Human Genome
Project [32, 52]. Thereafter, there has been an exciting race
toward faster, cheaper, and more accurate Whole Genome
Sequencing (WGS) technologies. Costs have quickly plunged
to $250K already in 2008 [41] and to a few thousand dollars in
the 2010’s [12, 13]. The long-anticipated $1,000 threshold was
breached, in January 2014, by the San Diego-based company
Illumina [42]. The landscape of companies and technologies
in WGS is fast-evolving, nonetheless, it is not far-fetched
to predict that, in 5-10 years, most individuals in developed
countries will have access to WGS.
The emergence of affordable WGS technologies represents
an exceptional breakthrough, due to the expected medical
and societal implications. Biomedical experts anticipate that
advances in WGS will unlock the full potential of personalized
medicine [20], i.e., the practice of tailoring pre-symptomatic
examinations, diagnosis, and treatment to patients’ genetic
features. Arguably, the availability of patient’s fully sequenced
genome enables clinicians, doctors, and testing facilities to run
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a number of complex genetic tests in a matter of seconds,
using specialized computational algorithms (as opposed to
more expensive and slower laboratory tests). However, due to
the extreme sensitivity of DNA data [11], WGS also comes at
the risk of amplifying important security, privacy, and ethical
concerns. These issues have been recently under the scrutiny of
several researchers [3] and policy experts [40] – we overview
them in Section II-B.
Motivation. The emergence of personal genomic tests as well
as the anticipated availability of affordable WGS technolo-
gies, along with the associated privacy and ethical concerns,
motivate the need for better understanding users’ perceptions
and attitudes. For instance, it is desirable to assess whether or
not privacy perceptions and concerns experienced by patients
correspond to what the scientific community would expect, as
well as how to identify effective mechanisms to communicate
potential privacy risks associated with genomic information
and its disclosure. Even more importantly, much of the antic-
ipated progress in personalized medicine, and human genome
research in general, will not happen without experimental
research relying on large cohorts of volunteers willing to
share their genetic material.1 Therefore, it is fundamental
to understand—and address—individuals’ concerns and fears
(such as embarrassment or discrimination) in order to retain
their trust and their willingness to participate.
A few studies (reviewed Section V) have analyzed individ-
uals’ response to learning the results of some genetic tests
and potential discrimination concerns associated with them,
but there is very little understanding of these concerns in the
context of WGS, and the new scenarios enabled by it.
Contributions. This paper presents the results of a series
of semi-structured interviews, involving 16 participants. We
aim to assess the perception of privacy and ethical issues
with WGS as well as the attitude toward different sequenc-
ing programs. Results are analyzed both quantitatively and
qualitatively, yielding a few interesting findings related to the
issues of control and trust, as users exhibit common fear of
discrimination and demand to strictly control how their genetic
information is used. Our exploratory study is vital to guide
follow-up (possibly larger) ethnographic studies on the topic,
1E.g., the US/Canada Personal Genome Project [9] and the UK 100K Genome
initiative [50] rely on volunteers that agree to have their genomic data made
publicly available.
which we plan to conduct as part of future work.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows: next section presents background information
about genomics and privacy/ethical concerns, then, Section III
presents our study design and participants’ demographics,
while Section IV analyzes study results, both quantitatively
and qualitatively. After reviewing related work in Section V,
the paper concludes in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
This section presents some background information on
genomics as well as privacy threats stemming from advances
in Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS).
A. Genomics Primer
We start with discussing Personalized Medicine – the prac-
tice of tailoring pre-symptomatic examinations, diagnosis, and
treatment to individuals’ genetic features. Genomic tests today
are increasingly and more effectively used in healthcare. For
instance, testing for the tpmt gene is already required prior
to prescribing some drugs used for treating childhood leuke-
mia [1]. Similarly, doctors prescribing Zelboraf (Roche’s treat-
ment for skin cancer) need to test the patient for the BRAFV
600E mutation. Other analogous examples include testing for
mutations in the Philadelphia chromosome (in Acute Lym-
phoblastic Leukemia patients) or in BRCA1/BRCA2 genes (in
breast and ovarian cancer patients).
Also, a few commercial companies, such as, 23andMe.com,
provide customers with reports on predisposition to diseases
and conditions, even though they do not yet rely on WGS.
(Specifically, 23andMe.com provides customers with a low-
cost (about $100) report assessing their genetic risk toward
a number of diseases and conditions, by testing for almost a
million specific Single-Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) [37,
47].) Also, several drugs (e.g., for cancer, HIV, or thrombosis
treatment) are paired today with genetic tests needed to assess
either the correct dosage or their expected effectiveness [1, 7,
38, 39].
Experts estimate that about a third of the 900 cancer drugs
currently in clinical trials will come to the market with a
DNA or other molecular test attached [7]. Although most
predominant, cancer treatment is only one of the application
fields of personalized medicine. For instance, for some cardiac
patients, recovery from a common heart procedure can be
complicated by a single gene responsible for drug processing,
and selection of blood thinner drugs should depend on whether
or not patient holds such a gene mutation [54].
In general, advances in WGS facilitate the understand-
ing of the impact of genetic variations on the response to
medications. For instance, researchers have discovered genes
encoding Cytochrome P450 enzymes, which metabolize neu-
roleptic medications to improve drug response and reduce
side-effects [10], and also genes involved in the action and
metabolism of warfarin (coumadin) – a medication used as an
anticoagulant [38].
The availability of whole human genomes will also facilitate
a number of genetic tests that today are performed in vitro, by
reducing costs and time. For instance, ancestry and genealog-
ical tests allow individuals to trace their lineage by analyzing
their genomic information (the scope of such tests being often
quite heterogeneous). Ancestry testing is increasingly popular,
e.g., to map one’s own genetic heritage and/or find known
ancestry. Several commercial entities (e.g., 23andMe.com and
Ancestry.com) provide customers with reports on their genetic
ancestry. They maintain a collection of sample genomes from
individuals belonging to different ethnic groups, and compare
them against their customers’ genomic information to under-
stand how they relate to known ethnic groups.
Genetic compatibility tests are used to let (potential or
actual) partners assess the possibility of transmitting to their
children a genetic disease with Mendelian inheritance [36].
For instance, Beta-Thalassemia minor causes red cells to be
smaller than average, due to a mutation in the hbb gene.
It is called minor when the mutation occurs only in one
chromosome, while the major variant—that occurs when both
chromosomes carry the mutation—is likely to result in prema-
ture death. Therefore, if both partners carry the minor form,
there is a non-negligible chance that their child will carry the
major variant.
B. WGS Privacy and Ethical Threats
While advances in genomics and sequencing technologies
promise to unlock a wide range of medical and societal
benefits, they also risk to amplify security, privacy, and ethical
concerns [3].
The human genome not only uniquely and irrevocably
identifies its owner, but also contains information about ethnic
heritage, predisposition to numerous diseases and conditions,
including mental disorders [8, 15, 17]. Furthermore, due to
its hereditary nature, disclosing one’s human genome also
implies, to a certain extent, disclosing the genomes of close
relatives [28].
Traditional approaches to privacy, such as de-identification
or aggregation, might not be effective when applied to genomic
information. [24] demonstrates the feasibility of re-identifying
DNA donors from a public research database using informa-
tion from popular genealogy websites. Additional results on
DNA and genome re-identification include [21, 27, 33–35, 51].
As the human genome contains detailed information about
susceptibility to somatic and mental conditions, ethnicity,
etc., its disclosure is often associated to fears of eugenism,
i.e., genetic discrimination, thus potentially affecting social
dynamics as well as hiring and healthcare practices. (See [18]
for a survey of self-reported genetic discrimination.)
These concerns creates the need for informed consent to
guard against surreptitious DNA testing by requiring au-
thorities and companies to obtain written permission from
citizens before collecting, analyzing, storing or sharing their
genetic information (e.g., preventing people from collecting
hair or saliva samples and maliciously sequencing the victims’
genome). However, on the other hand, such privacy-restrictive
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Age N %
18–24 2 12.5%
25–34 7 43.7%
35–44 3 18.7%
45–54 1 6.2%
55–64 1 6.2%
65–75 2 12.5%
Degree N %
College 4 25%
Master 8 50%
PhD 4 25%
Yearly Income N %
Less than $50K 3 18.7%
$50K-$75K 3 18.7%
More than $75K 10 62.5%
Westin Index N %
Unconcerned 4 25.0%
Pragmatist 7 43.7%
Fundamentalist 5 31.2%
TABLE I: Participants breakdown by age, education, (personal) yearly income, and Westin’s Privacy Index [30].
measures are often regarded as a potential obstacle to genomic
research. Scientists typically sequence DNA from thousands
of people to discover genes associated with particular diseases,
thus, the informed consent restriction would mean that large
genomic datasets could not be re-used to study a different
disease – researchers would either need to destroy the data
after each study, or track down thousands of former subjects
for new authorizations [44].
As mentioned earlier, much of the anticipated progress
in personalized medicine, and human genome research in
general, will not happen without experimental research re-
lying on large cohorts of volunteers willing to share their
genetic material. Therefore, it is fundamental to analyze—
and address—individuals’ concerns and fears in order to retain
their trust and their willingness to participate.
III. INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY
Our study consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews
with 16 participants (8 female, 8 male), conducted in Summer
2013. It was reviewed and approved by PARC’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Participants were recruited using social
networks and local mailing lists, announcing a study on the
“knowledge and perception of DNA testing.”
A. Participants
The 16 participants were US-based and ranged in ages from
18 to 74. We collected information about participants’ personal
yearly income, and assessed their Westin’s Privacy Index [30],
which classifies users among privacy fundamentalists, pragma-
tists, and unconcerned, according to their responses to a simple
three-question survey. Demographics breakdown is reflected
in Table I. Study participants volunteered to participate in the
study, i.e., they received no monetary incentive: we decided
to do so in order to recruit motivated users (who were also
likely to possess some understanding of genetics).
NOTE: We deliberately decided to recruit users with college
degrees and more participants in the 25-34 age range as they
constitute the representative population of early adopters of
personal genomic tests and WGS, as suggested by [14, 46].
This is crucial for our study since WGS is still at an early
(research) phase and is not yet available to “regular” users.
B. Experiments
Interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes (on average)
and consisted of three parts: (1) first, we asked participants
to provide 1-2 examples of genetic tests and describe their
familiarity with genetics; (2) we interviewed participants while
guiding them through a set of slides depicting a few hypothet-
ical scenarios (this constitutes the core of our study, see details
below); (3) in order to collect demographic information and
assess their Westin Privacy Index [30], participants were asked
to fill out a short survey.
We aimed to conduct the four experiments presented in
Table II below.
Exp. A Assessing the perception of today’s
genetic tests
Exp. B Comparing the attitude toward different
WGS programs
Exp. C Assessing the perception of potential
privacy/ethical issues with WGS
Exp. D Comparing the response to medical,
genomic, and personal information loss
TABLE II: Overview of study experiments and goals.
1) Experiment A: Perception of genetic tests: Participants
were shown the following six examples of genetic tests.
Note that the order in which the test scenarios were actually
presented was randomized across multiple participants.
(A.1) Disease Predisposition (Doctor.) Scott goes to see his
primary care doctor. The doctor asks Scott to run some genetic
tests to assess (genetic) predisposition to certain diseases. After
collecting a DNA sample (e.g., saliva), the clinic runs some
tests on Scott’s DNA, and the doctor tells Scott that he is
predisposed to type-2 diabetes, but not to Alzheimer’s.
(A.2) Genetic Compatibility. Emma and Scott are planning
to have kids. Emma has Beta-Thalassemia Minor, a genetic
disorder inherited by only one of her parents, which causes her
red cells to be smaller than usual but poses no critical health
threat to her. However, if Scott also has the same disorder,
there is a chance that their kids will have the Major form,
which may cause premature death. Therefore, Scott is advised
to take a genetic test to make sure that he doesn’t have the
disorder.
(A.3) Genetic Ethnicity. Scott is a customer of a genealogy
company, such as, Ancestry.com, which analyzes genetic eth-
nicity and reveals where one’s ancestors were form. Scott
needs to send a DNA sample (e.g., saliva) to the company,
which, after running some tests, tells Scott that his ethnic
origins are 39% Scandinavian, 17% Central European, etc.
(A.4) Disease Predisposition (Company.) Scott is a customer of
a personal genomics company, such as, 23andMe.com, which
3
provides its customers with a detailed report on their genetic
chances of getting a number of diseases, like type-2 diabetes,
Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia, etc. For each disease, the report
includes a risk percentage, the known average risk percentage,
and a confidence score. Scott needs to send a DNA sample
(e.g., saliva) to the company, which, after running some tests,
provides Scott access to a Web interface with the report.
(A.5) Correct Drug Dosage. Scott needs to take a blood
thinning drug like warfarin. His doctor, in order to better assess
the right dosage for him, requests that Scott takes a genetic
test. After collecting a DNA sample (e.g., saliva), the clinic
runs some tests and, based on the results, the doctor prescribes
the exact warfarin dosage for Scott.
(A.6) Correct Cancer Treatment. Scott is diagnosed with can-
cer. His doctor, prior to propose a treatment plan, requests that
Scott takes a genetic test to assess whether or not he carries a
certain DNA mutation. After collecting a DNA sample (e.g.,
saliva), the clinic runs some tests and, based on the results,
the doctor suggests what the best treatment for Scott is.
After showing the above test scenarios, we presented a re-
cap slide summarizing them. We then asked interviewees to
compare those scenarios; specifically, we raised questions like
“If you were in Scott’s shoes, would you do all of these tests?
Which ones would you not?” as well as more specific ones like
“If you were Scott, which tests would you feel more inclined
to do? Which tests more reluctant to?” Finally, we asked
participants to actually rank the six tests from the one they
felt most inclined to, to the one they felt most reluctant.
2) Experiment B: Attitude toward WGS: First, we presented
to the participants one slide describing (with both text and
pictures) Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), i.e., the process
of digitizing the complete DNA sequence of a human genome.
We told participants that once a whole human genome is
sequenced, all genetic tests, including those presented in
Experiment A., could be performed on the sequenced data,
using computer techniques. We also told them that computer
techniques could be faster and cheaper than collecting a
sample (and using expensive lab equipment) each time one
needs a genetic test.
Afterwards, we presented (again, in random order) the
following three scenarios.
(B.1) WGS with Healthcare Provider. Emma goes to see her
primary care doctor, who tells her about the provider’s exper-
imental Whole Genome Sequencing program. He explains to
her that, by having her genome sequenced, Emma may learn
her genetic predisposition to diseases and conditions. He also
tells her that the provider will keep her sequenced genome
along with her medical information, so that they can use it to
run genetic tests when needed for medical reasons. Also, the
provider will offer a discount on the next healthcare bill.
(B.2) WGS with Personal Genomics Company. Emma decides
to have her genome sequenced by using a personal genomics
company, such as, 23andMe.com. The company charges her
$100 to sequence her genome, give her a report about pre-
disposition to diseases and conditions, and tell her about her
genetic ancestry. Also, the company offers to store the data
for her: if she wants to authorize her doctor to run some tests,
she can grant him permission to contact the company.
(B.3) Data-only WGS (DVD). Emma decides to have her
genome sequenced by using a sequencing laboratory, which
charges her $100 to sequence her genome and send her a DVD
with the data.
After being presented with the above scenarios, participants
were shown a recap slide. We then invited them to compare
these scenarios; specifically, we asked “If you were Emma,
would you participate in any of the three programs? and
“Which program(s) would you feel more inclined to participate
in? Which one(s) less inclined? Finally, we asked participants
to rank the three scenarios from the one they felt most inclined
to, to the one they felt most reluctant to.
3) Experiment C: Perception of privacy/ethics issues with
WGS: In this experiment, we presented (in random order) the
following four hypothetical cases.
(C.1) Labor Discrimination. Emma is interviewing for a job
and her potential employer requests to run a drug test and to
access her genome. The employer finds out that Emma has
predisposition to cancer and decides not to hire her.
(C.2) Health Insurance Discrimination. Emma wants to join
a health insurance plan. The provider requests access to her
medical record as well as her genome, and finds out that she
has predisposition to leukemia. As a result, Emma needs to
pay a higher premium.
(C.3) Sequenced Genome Stolen by Hacker. A hacker steals
the file with Emma’s sequenced genome and finds out her
ethnicity/ancestry and that she has genetic predisposition to
Huntington’s disease.
(C.4) Sibling Donating Genome to Science. Emma’s brother,
Jack, decides to donate his genome to science (for medical
research purposes). Since Emma’s and Jack’s genomes are
99.9% identical, Jack is actually “donating” Emma’s genome
as well but has not asked for her permission.
After being presented with the above scenarios, participants
were shown a recap slide. We then asked to compare them;
specifically, we asked: “If you were Emma, what incident(s)
would give you the most discomfort? Which one(s) the least?
Finally, we asked participants to rank the four scenarios from
the one giving them the most discomfort, to the least.
4) Experiment D: Response to information loss: In the last
experiment, participants were asked to rank the following four
incidents (presented in random order) from the one they found
most frightening to the least.
(D.1) Identity. A hacker steals your financial information and
your social security number, i.e., so-called “identity theft.”
(D.2) Medical records. A hacker hacks into your clinic’s
databases and steals all your medical records.
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Genetic Tests: More to less inclined Avg Stdev
(A.6) Correct Cancer Treatment 5.81 0.39
(A.5) Correct Drug Dosage 4.63 0.70
(A.2) Genetic Compatibility 4.06 1.25
(A.1) Disease Predisp. (Doctor) 2.63 0.99
(A.4) Disease Predisp. (Company) 2.13 0.70
(A.3) Ancestry Testing 1.75 1.09
(a) Ranking average and standard deviation for Exp A.
WGS Programs: More to less inclined Avg Stdev
(B.3) Data-only (DVD) 2.68 0.58
(B.1) Healthcare Provider 2.00 0.71
(B.2) Personal Genomics Company 1.31 0.46
(b) Ranking average and standard deviation for Exp B.
Incidents: More to less discomfort Avg Stdev
(C.1) Labor Discrimination 3.31 0.58
(C.2) Health Insurance Discrimination 3.00 0.94
(C.3) Sequenced Genome Hacked 2.56 0.93
(C.4) Sibling Donating Genome to Science 1.13 0.33
(c) Ranking average and standard deviation for Exp C.
Information loss: More to less frightened Avg Stdev
(D.1) Identity Theft 3.50 0.63
(D.3) Emails and Pictures 2.63 1.61
(D.4) Sequenced Genome 2.00 0.63
(D.2) Medical Records 1.88 0.48
(d) Ranking average and standard deviation for Exp D.
TABLE III: Summary of Experiments.
(D.3) Emails and Pictures. A hacker hacks into your computer
and steals your personal emails and pictures.
(D.4) Sequenced Genome. A hacker steals the file containing
your sequenced genome.
IV. STUDY RESULTS
We now present the results of our study, via a quantitative
and qualitative analysis.
A. Theme 1: Trust
During Experiment A, we asked participants to rank six
genetic tests from the one they felt most inclined to, to the
least. We report the average rankings, along with standard
deviation, in Table IIIa. (Rankings are on a 1-6 scale, with
6 being the case participants felt most inclined to, 1 the least.)
(A.6), i.e., correct cancer treatment, emerged as the test to
which participants felt most inclined, with average ranking
5.81 (out of 6). 13/16 participants ranked (A.6) as the top
one, and all of them among the top two. Next follow (A.5),
i.e., correct drug dosage, and (A.2), i.e., genetic compatibility,
with, respectively, 15/16 and 13/16 of participants ranking it
among the top three.
At the other extreme, (A.3), ancestry testing, emerged as the
test scenario most of participants (10/16) felt the least inclined
to, with an overwhelming majority (12/16) ranking it among
the bottom two. However, only 2 participants mentioned that
they would not want to know their ancestry, while 8 reported
that they would not mind discovering it but found medical tests
much more relevant. Average ranking for (A.3) was 1.75, with
a relatively high standard deviation of 1.09.
(A.1), i.e., disease predisposition (doctor), and (A.4), i.e.,
disease predisposition (company), were ranked relatively sim-
ilar, mostly in the middle of the ranking scale. The former
obtained a slightly higher average, i.e., 2.63 vs 2.13, although
their difference was not statistically significant.
Participants exhibited a preference toward tests they consid-
ered immediately beneficial for their health (or that of their
kids), such as, (A.6), (A.5), and (A.2). In fact, the rankings for
(A.2), the test with lowest average in this category, and those
for (A.1), the test with highest average outside this category,
are statistically significant, as per Mann-Whitney U Test (U
= 210.5, n1 = n2 = 16, P < 0.01, two-tailed).
Finally, it is interesting to observe the difference between
(A.1) and (A.4): recall that, in both cases, the patient discovers
the genetic predisposition to certain diseases. There were 9/16
participants ranking (A.1) higher than (A.4), and 5 out of
9 justified this choice due to a lower trust in a commercial
company. For instance, P3 mentioned that she “would never
trust a website with my genome.” The other 4 participants
instead mentioned that they would prefer a doctor to explain
the test results, as the effects of genetic disease predisposition
were not completely clear to them. On the other hand, 7/16
participants ranked (A.4) higher than (A.1): 2 of them justified
this as they do not like to go to the doctor; 2 of them preferred
a broader analysis of all predispositions; and, the remaining
3 did not want their healthcare provider to know about their
predisposition, owing to fears of coverage denial or higher
premiums.
B. Theme 2: Control
In Experiment B, we aimed to understand and analyze
participants’ preference among three different options for
Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) programs. To this end,
we asked participants to rank these options from the one they
felt most incline to, to the least. The average rankings, along
with standard deviation, are reported in Table IIIb. (Rankings
are on a 1-3 scale, with 3 indicating the most favorite option,
1 the least favorite.)
The favorite option for a hypothetical WGS program was
(B.3), i.e., data-only WGS (DVD), with more than two thirds
of the participants (12/16) ranking it at very the top (average
ranking 2.68 out of 3). Whereas, half of the participants (8/16)
ranked option (B.1), WGS with healthcare provider, as their
second favorite. Clearly, option (B.2), WGS with personal
genomics company, seems to be the least preferred (1.31
average ranking), with two thirds of the participants (11/16)
ranking it at the bottom, and 16/16 ranking it among the
bottom two. In fact, the difference between the rankings of
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(B.2) and those of (B.1) is significant as per Mann-Whitney
U Test (U = 194, n1 = n2 = 16, P < 0.05, two-tailed).
We noticed that several participants, 12/16, mentioned that
they wanted to feel in control of their genomic data. In
particular, “control” was often used to justify the choice of
ranking (B.3) as the preferred WGS option. Recall that 12/16
participants expressed preference toward (B.3), i.e., obtaining
their sequenced genome on a DVD via a testing facility that
would not retain data. Among these, 7 participants (6 male, 1
female) mentioned control as their main motivation for doing
so, whereas, 5 users (all female) gave other reasons.2
P10 said “I would feel in control of my data,”, while he
would not trust it with the healthcare provider, as “they could
hold it against me.” And (B.2) would be “even worse as the
company would not be subject to the same standards as a
healthcare provider. Similarly, P14 reported she “would like
to own and control my genome, or at least let my family do”
and ranked (B.1) at the bottom, mentioning a complete lack
of control in giving the information to a healthcare provider.
Also, P12, P15, and P16 raised control as the main motivation
to prefer (B.3); nevertheless, P12 reported that he “wouldn’t
mind (B.1) if they can guarantee the same level of control,”
while both P15 and P16 mentioned that it would be necessary
to trust the sequencing facility not to retain the raw data.
Next, we noticed that 7/16 participants responded negatively
to the idea of receiving a discount on their next health bill in
exchange for letting their provider sequence their genome and
give a list of disease predispositions. P6 reported that “the
discount looks fishy [...] are they going to make a deal with
my genome?” P9 said “I don’t care if I get a discount, I would
prefer that they promise not to deny me coverage.” On the
other hand, P5, who ranked (B.3) higher than (B.1), pointed
out that she would consider changing her mind if the discount
was significant (“higher than $1,000.”)
Additional noteworthy remarks include P4 and P8 worrying
of losing the DVD with the sequenced genome and P16’s
fear of being served personalized ads by a personal genomics
company performing the sequencing.
C. Theme 3: Discrimination
Experiment C aimed to assess perception of potential pri-
vacy and ethical issues associated with genomic tests and
availability of whole genomes. Participants were asked to
compare four different incidents and rank them from the one
giving them the most discomfort, to the least.
The average rankings, along with standard deviation, are
reflected in Table IIIc. (Rankings are on a 1-4 scale, with 4
indicating the most frightening case, and 1 the least frighten-
ing.) Note: unlike Experiment A and Experiment B, a higher
ranking in Experiment C corresponds to a negative feeling.
(C.1), i.e., labor discrimination, and (C.2), i.e., health in-
surance discrimination, represented the incidents giving most
discomfort to the participants, with 12/16 participants ranking
2This also suggests a correlation between gender and preferring (B.3) because
of increased control, with χ2(1, N = 32) = 8.57 p < 0.01.
either one as the top. More specifically, almost one third of the
participants (10/16) ranked (C.1) and (C.2) as the two incidents
giving them most discomfort, owing to related discrimination
issues. Their average rankings were both above 3.00 (out of 4).
(C.1) actually seems to be the most discomforting scenario as
15/16 participants placed it in the top two, compared to 11/16
for (C.2).
Then, 4/16 participants felt that (C.3), i.e., sequenced ge-
nome hacked, was the most discomforting scenario. 2 of these
4 users actually reported that (C.3) would imply (C.1) and
(C.2), as a hacker could publish the genomic information or
sell it to employers and healthcare providers. Whereas, the
other 2 participants felt that they should be protected by the
law as for (C.1) and (C.2).
(C.4), i.e., sibling donating genome to science, represented
the case yielding the least discomfort, with 14/16 participants
ranking it at the bottom, and 16/16 among the bottom two. The
difference between rankings of (C.4) and those of (C.3), the
second least discomforting case, was statistically significant,
as per the Mann-Whitney U Test (U = 238.0, n1 = n2 = 16,
P < 0.001, two-tailed).
Concerns related to discrimination were raised by several
participants when motivating the rankings in Experiment C,
but also, indirectly, when discussing their concerns with re-
spect to Whole Genome Sequencing.
10/16 participants ranked (C.1) higher than (C.2): when
asked why, 5 out of these 10 participants reported that some-
how (C.2) was not too surprising. P5, P6, and P16 actually said
that healthcare cost discrimination already happens today, so
(C.2) would be somewhat expected. P16 also mentioned that
(C.2) “is understandable, they will be the ones to pay, and
they already take into account predisposition and pre-existing
conditions.”
Discomfort from (C.1) was often paired with an unfairness
feeling. P7 pointed out that predisposition “does not necessar-
ily mean that I will get the disease,” and P1 that predisposition
“doesn’t mean that I won’t be able to perform my job.”
Finally, (C.4) was the least frightening case for 14/16
participants: 9 of these said they were not concerned since
the genome is donated to science, for a good cause, and 5
trusted the research lab having access to their genome, since,
as pointed out by P13, “labs are subject to ethical reviews
and will not share data with anyone.”
D. Theme 4: Damage from Information Loss
The last experiment aimed to compare participants’ re-
sponse to incidents involving information loss. We asked them
to rank four hypothetical cases from the one they considered
most frightening to the one they considered least. The aver-
age rankings, along with standard deviation, are reported in
Table IIId. Rankings are on a 1-4 scale, with 4 indicating
the most frightening case, and 1 the least frightening.) Again,
unlike Experiment A and Experiment B, and similar to Exper-
iment C, a higher ranking in Experiment D corresponds to a
negative feeling.
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(D.1) represented the most frightening case for most par-
ticipants, with an average ranking of 3.50 (out of 4). Indeed,
10/16 participants ranked it as the most frightening scenario
and 15/16 among the top two. Then follows (D.3), with 6/10
participants ranking it at the top. Observe that the average
ranking is relatively low (2.63) with a high standard deviation
(1.61); almost half of the participants (7/16) ranked it among
the bottom two cases, and 5/16 at the very bottom.
(D.4) and (D.2) were ranked similar, with average rank-
ing, resp., 2.00 and 1.88, and no one labeling them as
the most frightening. We observed no statistically significant
difference between the two, suggesting that participants are
almost equally frightened with a hacker stealing their medical
records or their sequenced genome. But, we did observe a
statistically significant difference between (D.1) and (D.4),
suggesting that participants are not as frightened by loss of
genomic information as they are of identity theft (U = 230,
n1 = n2 = 16, P < 0.001, two-tailed).
We observed that several participants often used the degree
of damage produced by each incident involving information
loss to identify the most frightening cases. Experiment D
also exhibited some interesting correlations with participants’
demographics. We observed that most users with incomes
lower than 50K were most frightened by (D.3), i.e., their
personal emails and pictures being stolen (5/6), as opposed to
very few users (1/10) with higher incomes (χ2(1, N = 32) =
8.60 p < 0.01). Whereas, users with incomes higher than 50K
were most frightened by their identity being stolen (D.1), i.e.,
9/10 vs 1/6, resp., (χ2(1, N = 32) = 8.60 p < 0.01).
Next, we noticed that no privacy fundamentalist was most
frightened by loss of personal emails and pictures (0/5), as op-
posed to a slight majority of pragmatists/unconcerned (6/11).
Whereas, privacy fundamentalists were most frightened by
identity theft (5/5) as opposed to 5/11 for non-fundamentalists.
In both cases, it holds χ2(1, N = 32) = 4.36 p < 0.05, thus,
there might be a statistically significant correlation between
the Westin privacy index and being most frightened by either
identity theft or loss of emails and/or pictures.
Reasons for such correlations can be explained by noticing
that participants used the degree of damage as the discriminant
among information loss cases. Ostensibly, high-income users
have more to lose (money- and financial-wise) from identity
theft – e.g., P11 mentioned “It would cost me too much time
and money.” Also, privacy fundamentalists might not be afraid
of emails and pictures being stolen as they feel they take the
appropriate precautions – e.g., P2 reported “I always encrypt
my sensitive emails and do not keep pictures on my laptop.”
E. Discussion
In summary, our exploratory study unveils how complex
is to evaluate the perception of security, privacy, and ethical
issues related to the progress in Whole Genome Sequencing
(WGS), and its medical and societal consequences. We are
aware that our analysis does not provide definite answers, as
we interviewed a relatively small number (16) of US-based
volunteers, mostly high-educated and in the 25-34 age range.
Nonetheless, as suggested by [14] and [46], this seems to
constitute the representative population of early adopters of
personal genomic tests.
Therefore, while we expect our work to trigger further (and
possibly larger) ethnographic studies in the field, we do draw
some preliminary conclusions:
1) Labor and healthcare discrimination are top concerns
among users, with an increase unfairness feeling asso-
ciated with the former, and a lack of confidence in the
protection granted by the law. Fear of discrimination was
predominant in our study, even more so than privacy
concerns.
2) Users consistently raised the issue of control and pre-
ferred to retain and own data with their sequenced
genome. This suggests that design of genomics-related
systems and applications should include mechanisms to
let the users feel in control of their data.
3) Motivated by trust concerns, users prefer that doctors
administered medical genetic tests, rather than specialized
personal genomics companies.
4) Perception of genetic tests is strongly related to the
associated perceived medical benefit. Participants were
mostly inclined to genetic tests that can help fight dis-
eases, but less to tests that can help prevent them, and
neutral w.r.t. discovering their ancestry. Although not
totally unexpected, this indicates the need for identifying
aligned incentives and for informed consent.
5) Participants were more frightened by having their finan-
cial identity and/or personal data stolen (with a bias to-
ward the former for high-income, privacy fundamentalist
users) than medical and genomic information. However,
the perception of genomic information loss varied signif-
icantly among different participants and suggested that
participants were more scared of their insurance provider
or their employer using genomic information against
them than of a hacker having access to it.
V. RELATED WORK
The emergence of personal genomic tests and affordable
Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) motivate the need for bet-
ter understanding related perception and concerns of involved
users. However, much is left to be studied, since, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no ethnographic study on Whole
Genome Sequencing prior to our work.
Francke et al. [16] interviewed 63 customers of
23andMe.com that tested for BRCA mutations. (BRCA
gene mutations convey a high risk for breast and ovarian
cancer). They analyzed customers’ response among 32
mutation carriers (16 women, 16 men) and 31 non-carriers
and concluded that direct access to BRCA mutation tests
provided benefits to participants. None of the 25 users that
had unexpectedly found out to carry the mutation reported
extreme anxiety, and 4 experienced moderate, transitory
anxiety, similar to the findings by Hamilton et al. [26].
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Additional studies analyzing patients’ response to genetic
tests for disease predisposition include [45] (colon cancer),
[22] (Alzheimer’s disease), [4, 6] (breast cancer). Also,
Andrews [2] analyzed the concept of “survivor’s guilt”
experienced by individuals learning not to carry a harmful
mutation, while a family member does.
Brothers et al. [5] found out that, when asked about an opt-
out consent process, over 90 percent of participants agreed
or strongly agreed that “DNA biobank research is fine as
long as people can choose not to have their DNA included.”
Some studies highlighted how privacy concerns are often an
important obstacle to participation in large cohort studies [53].
Although 60 percent of people surveyed said they would par-
ticipate in a study that involved storing data in biorepositories,
91 percent of those potential research participants would be
concerned about privacy [29]. Another study showed that,
while participants trusted clinicians and researchers, they were
concerned that results of genetic tests could end up in the
wrong hands and be used against them [19].
Lapham et al. [31] were among the first, in 1996, to
analyze consumers’ perspectives as to genetic discrimination
and reported that people cited fear of losing insurance as a
major reason to avoid genetic testing. However, discrimination
by insurance companies was not a widespread reality in the
90s, as few of these cases had been filed and even fewer
had been won [25]. Many states have passed laws to protect
medical (and also genetic) information, such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which
provides a general framework for sharing and protecting
Protected Health Information. In the U.S., there also exists
legislation specific against genetic discrimination – the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) – which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of genetic information with respect
to health insurance and employment [49]. However, neither
GINA or HIPAA placed any limits on health insurance rate
setting.
Also, prior work analyzed the issue of labor discrimination
in relationship to disease predisposition, mostly from the legal
standpoint. We refer to the work by Guttmacher et al. [23] for
details, along with a review of well-known rulings.
Ruiz et al. [43] compared the attitude of 279 patients from
the United States and Spain who had volunteered to donate
a sample for genomic research, and showed that 48% of
participants would like to be informed about all individual
results from future genomic studies using their donated tissue,
especially those from the U.S. (71.4%) and those believing
that genetic information poses special risks (69.7%). Trinidad
et al. [48] explored the attitude of research participants and
possible future participants regarding Genome-Wide Asso-
ciation Studies (GWAS): they found out that participants
expressed a variety of opinions about the acceptability of wide
sharing of genetic and phenotypic information for research
purposes through large, publicly accessible data repositories.
Most believed that making de-identified study data available
to the research community was a social good to be pursued.
Privacy and confidentiality concerns were common, although
not necessarily precluding participation. Also, many partici-
pants voiced reservations about sharing data with for-profit
organizations.
A recent report from the Presidential Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Issues [40] analyzed advances of Whole
Genome Sequencing (WGS), and focused on potential privacy
and ethical threats. The report listed 12 recommendations and
provided a high-level effort to identify and promote policies
and practices that ensure scientific research, healthcare deliv-
ery, and technological innovation are conducted in a socially
and ethically responsible manner.
Thus, we conclude that, while prior work has looked at
responses to learning genetic test results as well as discrimi-
nation concerns associated with genomics, no prior study has
focused on the human factor in Whole Genome Sequencing.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the results of a series of semi-
structured interviews involving 16 participants, that aimed
to assess the perception of genetic tests, the attitude toward
different Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) programs, as
well as their concerns with associated privacy and ethical
threats. The results of our interviews were analyzed both
quantitatively and qualitatively and showed that interviewees
exhibited common fear of discrimination and demanded to
retain strict control over their genetic information. Our ex-
ploratory analysis suggests that the issues of control, trust, and
discrimination are crucial aspects that the community should
take into account, not only from a policy standpoint, but also
for user-centered designs of genomics-related applications that
involve end-users (such as, ancestry and disease predisposition
testing).
Our study highlights the need for more ethnographic studies
in the field as well as the importance of informing the public
with respect to privacy threats associated with genomic infor-
mation disclosure and legal rights addressing discrimination
issues.
As part of future work, we plan to run follow-up user
studies, relying on larger populations, that can further clarify
some of the issues discussed in this paper. We are also working
on strategies to raise awareness of privacy, ethical, and legal
issues associated with WGS, as well as on user-centered
designs of privacy-respecting genomic-testing platforms.
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